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THE LIABILITY OF CO-MAKERS OF PROMISSORY
NOTES: JOINT OR SOLIDARY?
Several recent Louisiana cases demonstrate that the liability of co-
makers of promissory notes may turn on the difference between a
parenthesis and a slash. For example, one court found that a promissory
note containing the promissory language "I/We promise to pay," fol-
lowed by the signatures of the two co-makers, created solidary liability
among the debtors.' Conversely, another court held that several prom-
issory notes with the wording "I(We) promise to pay" created only
joint liability among the co-makers. 2
Obviously many judicial interpretations of the language in contracts
rest on the placement of key punctuation marks. In the realm of ne-
gotiable instruments law, however, certainty is premier. Such case-by-
case adjudication invariably leads to inconsistencies among the courts,
thereby defeating this goal. The very nature of negotiable promissory
notes demands that there be uniformity in interpretation of the prom-
issory language in that type of commercial transaction.
The ambivalence of Louisiana courts in the interpretation of prom-
issory language affecting the liability of co-makers of promissory notes
results from a longstanding but now anomalous Louisiana jurisprudential
rule. This rule states that a promissory note signed by two or more
makers with the language "We promise to pay" creates only joint liability
among the debtors,3 while the language "I promise to pay" creates
solidary liability. 4 Because the usage of "I" or "We" determines the
liability of the makers, instruments that contain both pronouns require
judicial interpretation, in the absence of legislation, to determine which
pronoun is to be given legal effect.
Alternative use of the pronouns "I" or "We" is not problematic
in the other states. All states except Louisiana have adopted the uniform
version of section 3-118(e) of the Uniform Commercial Code,' which
was specifically drafted to eliminate any question regarding the liability
Copyright 1989, by LOUiSIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. See Evangeline Fed. Say. and Loan v. Catha, 520 So. 2d 1314 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1988), discussed infra text accompanying notes 40-45.
2. See Gavin v. Superior Applicators, Inc., 484 So. 2d 792 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
writ denied, 487 So. 2d 439 (1986), discussed infra text accompanying notes 34-39.
3. See Watkins v. Haydel, 172 La. 826, 135 So. 371 (1931), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 14-29.
4. See La. R.S. 10:3-118(e) (1983), discussed infra text accompanying notes 9-14.
5. See id. comment. Louisiana alone has retained the old Negotiable Instruments
Law § 17(7), formerly La. R.S. 7:17(7).
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of makers of notes containing alternative promissory language. Accord-
ingly, in all states except Louisiana, regardless of the wording used,
joint and several liability-common law solidarity6-is the presumed
effect of negotiable instruments signed by two or more makers. 7
For the reasons set forth in the discussion that follows, Louisiana
should adopt the uniform version of section 3-118(e) of the Uniform
Commercial Code in order to bring its commercial law into accord with
modern commercial practices and accepted negotiable instruments law.
Before proceeding to this discussion, however, a review of the decisions
and legislation that have shaped the current state of the law will clarify
the discrepancy between Louisiana law and uniform commercial law.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF LOUISIANA LAW
In 1975, ostensibly unifying its commercial law with that of the
other states, Louisiana adopted article three (Commercial Paper) of the
Uniform Commercial Code.8 One of the provisions that the legislature
declined to adopt was the uniform text of section 3-118(e).9 As adopted
by the other forty-nine states, section 3-118(e) provides that "unless the
instrument otherwise specifies, two or more persons who sign as
maker,. . as a part of the same transaction, are jointly and severally
liable even though the instrument contains such words as 'I promise to
pay.' "10 This provision creates a presumption of joint and several
liability, the common law equivalent of in solido liability. It is intended
to provide rules of construction for any ambiguity that may arise when
the liability of the parties is not expressed in the instrument. The section
6. Joint and several liability at common law is considered to be synonymous with
solidary liability at civil law. See Johnson v. Jones-Journet, 320 So. 2d 533, 537 (La.
1975). The Louisiana Legislature retained the common law term "joint and several" in
Revised Statutes 10:3-118(e) instead of replacing it with "solidary." In this note, the term
"joint and several" liability will be used interchangeably with "solidary" liability. The
reader should be cautioned, however, that "joint" liability at common law is not syn-
onymous with "joint" liability at civil law, where the terms have a different meaning.
See discussion infra text accompanying notes 19-24.
7. This does not mean that the co-makers cannot unequivocally express in the note
liability other than joint and several. For example, a note signed by two or more co-
makers with the language "We jointly promise to pay" will create only joint liability
among the debtors. U.C.C. § 3-118(e) merely creates the presumption of joint and several
liability if the liability of the parties is not expressed in the note. By contrast, the rule
in Louisiana is precisely the opposite, i.e., the presumption is against solidary (joint and
several) liability.
8. See 1974 La. Acts No. 92, § 1.
9. The legislature instead replaced the uniform text with the text of the old Negotiable
Instruments Law § 17(7), formerly La. R.S. 7:17(7). See La. R.S. 10:3-118(e) comment
(1983).
10. U.C.C. § 3-118(e). Cf. Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law § 17(7).
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uses the language "I promise to pay," followed by the signature of two
or more makers, as an example of promissory language that creates a
presumption of "joint and several" liability even though it is not stip-
ulated on the instrument. Accordingly, common law jurisdictions have
concluded that the language "We promise to pay," followed by the
signatures of two or more makers, also creates a presumption of joint
and several liability." Thus, unless language expresses a clear intent
otherwise, each co-maker is bound for the whole sum.
By contrast, Louisiana replaced the official text of section 3-118(e)
with the following provision: "When an instrument containing the words
'I promise to pay' is signed by two or more persons, they are deemed
to be jointly and severally liable thereon. 1' 2 The only difference between
the official version and Louisiana's version that appears to be significant
is that the uniform version's language, "such words as 'I promise to
pay,"' indicates that "I promise to pay" is merely illustrative of joint
and several language. Therefore, language such as "We promise to pay"
also can be construed as creating joint and several liability. Louisiana's
version does not indicate whether the language "I promise to pay" is
also illustrative of language that creates solidary liability; nothing in
Louisiana's version indicates the effect of the replacement of "J" with
its plural, "We." Were it not for the comment following Louisiana
Revised Statutes 10:3-118(e), one could argue that Louisiana Revised
Statutes 10:1-102(5)(a), which states that "words in the singular number
include the plural, and in the plural include the singular,"' 3 should apply
and provide for solidary liability regardless of the use of "I" or "We."
The comment to Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:3-118(e) makes it clear,
however, that the legislature replaced the uniform version of the text
with the old law in order to "preserve the rule of Watkins v. Haydel.' ' 4
II. THE RULE OF WATKNS V. HAYDEL
In Watkins v. Haydel,"5 the plaintiff sought judgment against two
defendants who had signed a promissory note worded "We promise to
pay." One debtor had signed an acknowledgment of the debt within
the five-year prescriptive period, while the other had not. If the defen-
dants were bound in solido, the acknowledgment by one debtor would
have interrupted prescription with respect to the other debtor. The
Louisiana Supreme Court held that the words "We promise to pay"
11. See Simpson v. Wages, 119 Ga. App. 324, 167 S.E. 2d 213 (1969); Ghitter v.
Edge, 118 Ga. App. 750. 165 S.E. 2d 598 (1968).
12. La. R.S. 10:3-118(e) (1983).
13. La. R.S. 10:1-102(5)(a) (1983).
14. See La. R.S. 10:3-118(e) comment (1983).
15. 172 La. 826, 135 So. 371 (1931).
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created only joint, not solidary, liability among the debtors. Therefore,
the claim against the nonacknowledging debtor had prescribed. 6
The Watkins court based its holding on three very early Louisiana
decisions 7 that had also construed "We promise to pay" language as
creating only joint liability, and "I promise to pay" language as creating
joint and several liability. 8 In these decisions, the courts looked to the
law merchant of England as well as the common law of the other states
to make their determinations. 9 It should be noted, however, that joint
liability at common law is not equivalent to civil law joint liability.20
Procedurally, both common law and civil law joint liability have
the same effect: all the obligors are necessary parties to an action to
enforce a joint obligation, 2' and interruption of prescription with respect
to one party does not interrupt prescription with respect to the others. 22
On the other hand, the substantive effect of joint liability among debtors
at common law is not equivalent to the substantive effect of joint liability
at civil law. At common law each obligor is liable for the whole
performance, 23 while at civil law a joint obligor is only liable for his
virile share. 24 The substantive equivalent at civil law to common law
16. Id. at 827, 135 So. 371.
17. Mayor of New Orleans v. Ripley, 5 La. 120, 25 Am. Dec. 175 (1833); Barrow
v. Norwood, 3 La. 437 (1832); Bennett v. Allison, 2 La. 419 (1831).
18. Bank of Louisiana y. Sterling, 2 La. 60 (1830).
19. See Barrow, 3 La. at 438.
20. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 289(1) (1981): "Where two or more
parties to a contract promise the same performance to the same promisee, each is bound
for the whole performance thereof, whether his duty is joint, several, or joint and several."
The comment to this section distinguishes the liability of joint obligors at common law
from the liability of joint obligors in Louisiana:
In the civil law system of Louisiana, promises of the same performance create
"joint" liability on the part of each promisor... "Joint" liability (in Louisiana)
means liability only for an aliquot share of the total obligation . . . Common
Law terminology and results are quite different: promises of the same perform-
ance may create joint duties, several duties, or joint and several duties; and
each promisor is liable for the whole performance promised.
21. See La. Code. Civ. P. art. 643. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 290
(1981).
22. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 291 & comment (b) (1981). See also
Watkins v. Haydel, 172 La. 826, 135 So. 371 (1931). While there is no provision in the
Louisiana Civil Code that states specifically that interruption of prescription with respect
to one joint obligor will not interrupt prescription with respect to the other joint obligors,
this jurisprudential rule follows by virtue of the distinction between joint liability and
solidary liability.
23. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §289(1) & comment (a) (1981) (each obligor
is liable for the whole performance).
24. See La. Civ. Code art. 1789, which provides that "each joint obligor is bound
to perform ... only his portion."
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joint liability is solidary liability. 2
In one of those early decisions upon which Watkins is based the
court noted that the effects of joint liability were different under each
system, but stated that "a joint note in Louisiana must have whatever
effect her laws give to such an obligation. '26 This assertion cannot
withstand analysis. If joint liability at common law is not synonymous
with joint liability at civil law, treating the two as if they are identical
is a fallacy of equivocation. The function of the court in a contract
dispute is to construe the language of the agreement so that it corresponds
to the parties' intent. If the court bases its determination of that intent
on what the common law has labeled "joint liability," then the court
should render its decision in terms of what is equivalent at civil law to
common law joint liability. Unfortunately, there is no real equivalent
at civil law.27
Ironically, the court's holding in Watkins that the defendants were
joint obligors at civil law was in accord with the then existing common
law rule. 2s The issue in that case concerned only the procedural effects
of imposing joint liability, which are the same for both common law
and civil law. Unfortunately, the holding was based on earlier decisions
that wrongly equated civil law "joint liability" with the common law
term, irrespective of their distinction.
The rule of Watkins appears to be supported by Louisiana Civil
Code article 1796, and Louisiana courts have frequently utilized that
article to negate arguments in favor of solidarity. 29 The* article states
that "[s]olidarity of obligation shall not be presumed. A solidary ob-
ligation arises from a clear expression of the parties' intent or from the
law." 30 Although -the law is settled that "I promise to pay" is an
expression of solidarity, no Louisiana court has explained why the
wording "We promise to pay" is any less clear an expression of the
parties' intent to be bound solidarily. At any rate, Louisiana courts
25. See La. Civ. Code art. 1794: "An obligation is solidary for the obligors when
each obligor is liable for the whole performance."
26. Barrow v. Norwood, 3 La. 437, 438 (1832).
27. As previously stated, joint liability at common law is equivalent to in solido
liability at civil law in its substantive effect, but it is equivalent to civil law joint liability
in its procedural effect.
28. Common law jurisdictions later added "several" liability to the joint liability
already imposed on co-makers of promissory notes containing the language "We promise
to pay." See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 289(3) (1981): "By statute in most
states some or all promises which would otherwise create only joint duties create joint
and several duties." This change was codified in section 3-118(e) of the U.C.C. See
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 289 comment (d) (1981).
29. See Johnson v. Jones-Journet, 320 So. 2d 533 (La. 1975); Swan v. Mayer, 211
So. 2d 346 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
30. La. Civ. Code art. 1796.
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have consistently held that, absent any other evidence showing that the
makers intended to be solidarily bound, only notes containing the word-
ing "I promise to pay" followed by the signatures of two or more the
parties creates a presumption of solidarity.3
The uncontradicted law in Louisiana with respect to the liability of
co-makers of negotiable promissory notes may be summarized as follows:
When two or more persons sign a promissory note as makers with the
language "I promise to pay," they are deemed to be solidarily bound,32
however, when two or more persons sign a promissory note as makers
with the language "We promise to pay," they are deemed to be only
jointly bound.33
III. INSTRUMENTS CONTAINING ALTERNATIVE WORDING
As a result of the perceived distinction between "I promise to pay"
and "We promise to pay" a more important problem of interpretation
has arisen in the Louisiana circuit courts. This involves the interpretation
of promissory language on notes containing both the "I" and "We"
wording, followed by the signatures of two or more makers. For example,
in Gavin v. Superior Applicators, Inc. , 4 the plaintiff, holding five
promissory notes in the amount of $50,550.00, sued five defendants,
each of whom had signed all the notes as makers. Each note was drafted
on a standardized form containing the wording "I(We) promise to
pay."" The plaintiff argued that the defendants were liable in solido,
stressing that the word "I" in the notes created solidary liability, re-
gardless of the inclusion of "We." 3 The court, however, agreed with
the defendants' contention that the parenthetical "We" was analogous
to standard forms containing words such as "person(s)," whereby the
"(s)" would be read in or out depending upon how many people were
being referred to in the document.37 The court reasoned, "[I]n common
usage, the 'I' would be read out of the sentence as more than one party
was being referred to, and the pronoun '(We)' would be used. We will
not presume that the language 'I(We) promise to pay' with no additional
language creates solidary liability." 3 If this reasoning is correct, then
31. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Soileau, 323 So. 2d 221 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975);
Shreveport Bank and Trust Co. v. Tyler, 275 So. 2d 451 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973).
32. See Ford Motor Credit Co., 323 So. 2d at 225; Shreveport Bank and Trust Co.,
275 So. 2d at 452. See also La. R.S. 10:3-118(e) (1983).
33. See Johnson, 320 So. 2d at 536; Watkins v. Haydel, 173 La. 826, 135 So. 371
(1931); Swan, 211 So. 2d at 349.
34. 484 So. 2d 792 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 487 So. 2d 439 (1986).
35. Id. at 794.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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a note containing the promissory language "I promise to pay" followed
by the signature of two or more parties makes no sense grammatically.
The court here merely concluded that if the note is signed by more
than one person the pronoun must be "We." The court should have
interpreted the "I(We)" language as creating an ambiguity, allowing the
introduction of parol evidence. In such a case, the presumption would
be against solidarity, 39 but could be overcome by such evidence.
By contrast, the court in Evangeline Federal Savings & Loan v.
Catha4° construed a promissory note containing both "I" and "We"
language as creating solidary liability among the co-makers. In this case
two defendants had signed "individually and as agents for their wives" 41
a three-hundred-thousand dollar promissory note containing the typed
in language "I/We promise to pay. ' 42 The court distinguished the slash,
or virgule, in this note from the parentheses in the Gavin note. The
use of the parentheses in Gavin resulted in a reading out of the "I,"
while the slash in Evangeline did not. The court then affirmed the trial
court's finding based upon parol evidence that the defendants were
solidarily liable. The evidence included a mortgage note in which the
defendants had expressly bound themselves in solido.43 This decision is
more soundly reasoned than Gavin. In Gavin the court reasoned that
the "I(We)" promissory language did not create an ambiguity, but
required that the pronoun "I" be read out because more than one
maker signed the note. On the other hand, the Evangeline court rec-
ognized both that the "I/We" language was ambiguous and that soli-
darity could not be presumed; but this did not prevent the plaintiff
from introducing evidence to defeat this presumption."
The problems exemplified by the two cases above would, of course,
not arise if words expressly stipulated the liability of the makers of the
promissory notes. Because it is impractical to have an attorney present
to ensure that the liability of the parties is expressed in every note
drafted, one can expect continuing litigation in this area, particularly
with the increasing proliferation of the pre-printed form. Until the
Louisiana Legislature takes remedial action by adopting the uniform
version of section 3-118(e), lawyers should be aware of our courts'
peculiar treatment of this problem.
39. La. Civ. Code art. 1796.
40. 520 So. 2d 1314 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988).
41. Id. at 1317.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. The Gavin court did not consider the "I(We)" language as creating an ambiguity
whereby solidarity could not be presumed, in which case, it would have been proper to
look to usage or parol evidence to determine the liability of the makers. Rather, the
court ruled that this language created joint liability.
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In summary, the Louisiana courts have construed the liability of
co-makers of promissory notes containing alternative promissory lan-
guage in the following two situations: 45 First, the "I(We) promise to
pay" language followed by the signatures of two or more makers creates
joint liability. Only the Gavin court has ruled in this instance. Second,
the "I/We promise to pay" language followed by the signatures of two
or more makers creates solidary liability. The Evangeline Federal Savings
and Loan v. Catha court held that such wording creates solidary liability,
but it should be noted that the decision rested on strong parol evidence
indicating solidary liability. The court distinguished the slash used here
from the parentheses used in the Gavin case.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has not ruled on either of the si-
tuations presented above. Should such a case come before the court,
any decision requiring the court to choose between the words "I" or
"We" will create an opportunity for it to re-examine both the inter-
pretation given to Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:3-118(e) and the rule
of Watkins v. Haydel. Ideally, the Louisiana Legislature will some day
amend Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:3-118(e) to legislatively overrule
Watkins and bring about the much desired uniformity of Louisiana's
negotiable instruments law with the rest of America. The following
discussion will examine some of the problems in keeping the status quo.
IV. WATKINS AND THE CONCEPT OF NEGOTIABILITY
The comment to Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:3-118(e) states that
the official text of subparagraph (e) was replaced in order to preserve
the Watkins46 rule that a promissory note signed by two or more co-
makers with the wording "We promise to pay" creates only joint lia-
bility. This rule is offensive to the modern understanding of the concept
of negotiability.
The formal requisites of negotiability of a promissory note are
directly related to the risks and administrative costs incurred by the
holder of the note.47 The purpose of the formal requisites, indeed, the
very idea of negotiability, embodies the notion of minimizing the risks
and administrative costs to the payee or holder. The risks are measured
by the likelihood that the payee or holder will be paid the sum owed
45. The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled on a similar issue,
construing language in a promissory note that read "I, We, or either of us promises to
pay" as creating solidary liability among the co-makers. The court stated that the inclusion
of "either of us" eliminated any ambiguity by indicating that the holder could look to
either party for payment of the sum stated in the note. See Federal Sav. and Loan Ins.
Corp. v. Murry, 853 F.2d 1251, 1257 (5th Cir. 1988).
46. 172 La. 826, 135 So. 371 (1931).
47. See Hawkland & Lawrence, Uniform Commercial Code Series, § 3-104:01 (1984).
1114 [Vol. 49
COMMENTS
when payment is due. The administrative costs include costs of collection
as well as costs incurred by the payee or holder in accessing the risks
involved in the loan. Interest rates are also affected by these costs and
risks. Any rule that two or more co-makers are only jointly liable, as
defined by Louisiana law, increases the risk that the holder may receive
only a portion of the sum due. Furthermore, the administrative costs
in assessing those risks are increased. In the event of a default, the
holder must pursue all of the parties, thereby increasing attorney's fees
as well as the procedural risks effected by joint liability. The U.C.C.
lowers these risks and costs.
The stated policy behind the uniform version of section 3-118(e) is
"to protect holders and to encourage the free circulation of negotiable
paper by stating rules of law which will preclude a resort to parol
evidence for any purpose except reformation of the instrument. '48 The
rule of Watkins defeats this policy for three reasons: First, it fails to
protect holders from the risk of non-payment by giving the debtor the
defense of being merely a joint obligor, liable only for his virile share;
second, it discourages the free circulation of negotiable paper (discount-
ing)49 by increasing risks and administrative costs (both actual and po-
tential); third, it encourages the introduction of parol evidence to ascertain
the intent of the parties in such cases as exemplified by Gavin and
Evangeline. Moreover, the overall purpose of the Uniform Commercial
Code expressed both in the official text and in Louisiana Revised Statutes
10:1-102(2)(c) is "to promote uniformity of the law among the various
jurisdictions." 50 This goal is clearly subverted by Louisiana's version of
section 3-118(e) and the Watkins rule. As interstate banking becomes a
reality in our credit .economy the effects of this disunity acquires more
significance.
V. THE LOUISANA CIVM CODE
As mentioned above, proponents of maintaining the status quo have
frequently based their arguments on Louisiana Civil Code article 1796. 51
This article provides that there is no presumption of solidarity except
as evidenced by the clear expression of the parties or by law. The use
of this article in the commercial paper context is unfortunate, stemming
48. U.C.C. § 3-118 comment 1.
49. Payees of negotiable promissory notes often sell the notes at or near face value
in order to raise cash. This process is known as discounting. The purchaser then becomes
a holder of the instrument and is entitled to collect from the maker the sum due. One
can easily see, then, that a note carrying a high risk of cbllection is harder to discount.
Hence, it is less marketable.
50. La. R.S. 10:1-102(2)(c) (1983).
51. See Johnson v: Jones-Journet, 320 So. 2d 533, 535 (La. 1975).
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from Louisiana's failure to adopt a commercial code distinct from the
law pertaining to civil matters. The use of a presumption of solidary
liability in commercial matters is not contrary to civilian tradition.12 In
France, for example, solidarity is presumed among the co-signers of
promissory notes.53 French law distinguishes between civil matters, where
the Code Napoleon requires that solidarity must be expressly stipulated,
and commercial matters, where "usage supplies the stipulation of sol-
idarity."' 54 This usage guides courts' search for the intent of the parties.
The notion of interpreting ambiguous terms in a contract by referring
to custom or usage is not alien to Louisiana law. Both prior jurisprudence"
and Louisiana Civil Code article 2053 dictate that ambiguous terms of
a contract must be interpreted in light of usagei 6 In order to achieve
uniformity with respect to negotiable instruments law, while remaining
consistent with civil law tradition, our courts should adopt the accepted
"usage" of all the other states in construing the language of promissory
notes-the uniform version of section 3-118(e).
Even without following the French and distinguishing between ne-
gotiable instruments law and civil law, it is still possible to argue that
co-makers of promissory notes should be treated as liable in solido.
Louisiana Civil Code article 1818 provides that "[a]n indivisible obli-
gation with more than one obligor or obligee is subject to the rules
governing solidary obligations." ' 7 Likewise, Louisiana Civil Code article
1789 states that "[w]hen a joint obligation is indivisible, joint obligors
or obligees are subject to the rules governing solidary obligors or solidary
obligees." s "Although no presumption of solidarity is created," 59 "an
indivisible joint obligation is given the same effects as if it were soli-
dary." 6 The issue, then, is whether a joint promise to pay, such as
52. 2 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6 tlmentaire De Droit Civil, § 739A (La. St. L. Inst.
trans. I1th ed. 1959). Under French commercial law, co-signers of bills of exchange or
promissory notes are deemed to be solidarily liable.
53. Id.
54. Id. at § 736.
55. See Southern Bitulithic Co. v..Algiers Ry. & Lighting Co., 130 La. 830, 58 So.
588 (1912), where it was said that "usage enters into every contract" and may be shown
for the purpose not only of elucidating it, but also of completing it. See also Fontenot's
Rice Drier, Inc. v. Farmers Rice Milling Co., 329 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 333 So. 2d 239 (1976), where the court concluded that "custom" may be employed
not only to modify or restrict a contract but also to enlarge it.
56. La. Civ. Code art. 2053: "A doubtful provision must be interpreted in light of
the nature of the contract, equity, usages, the conduct of the parties before and after
the formation of the contract, and of other contracts of a like nature between the same
parties."
57. Id. art. 1818.
58. Id. art. 1789.
59. Id. comment (d).
60. Id. comment (a).
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that created on a promissory note with the language "We promise to
pay," is an indivisible obligation. Article 1815 states that "[a]n obligation
is indivisible when the object of the performance, because of its nature
or because of the intent of the parties, is not susceptible of division." '61
The latter type of indivisibility is contractual. This is not a question of
whether the sum stated on the promissory note is divisible, nor whether
money is divisible. These are always divisible. Rather, it must be de-
termined whether the parties, both obligor and obligee, as evidenced on
the note, contemplated partial performance. 62 The use of Civil Code
article 1796 in this context rests on the friction that the parties did not
contemplate individual liability for the total amount borrowed. Yet, if
each of the makers of the note only intended to borrow his virile share
and be liable for that share only, reason dictates the conclusion that
each maker would have executed a note individually for the amount he
intended to borrow. Clearly, then, a single promissory note stating an
unconditional promise to pay a sum certain at a fixed time or on
demand does not comport with the notion that the parties intended
partial performance of the promise. 63 Hence, the obligation on a ne-
gotiable promissory note should be regarded as indivisible, and the
makers of such notes should be deemed solidarily bound.
VI. SuMMARY
Certainty is of utmost importance in the law of negotiable instru-
ments. This concern is reflected in the Uniform Commercial Code sec-
tions detailing the formal requisites of negotiability. 64 The degree of
certainty in which a holder of a promissory note can expect performance
of the promise directly effects the negotiability of the note. Because the
co-makers of promissory notes are generally well acquainted with one
another, they are in a much better position to assess the risk that one
of the parties may be unwilling or unable to honor the promise of
payment. Therefore, the makers, not the payee or holder, should bear
61. Id. art. 1815 (emphasis added).
62. Planiol, supra note 52, at § 787: Contractual Indivisibility-The indivisibility is
contractual when the thing which makes the object of the obligation is in all respects
divisible, but the parties intend that the obligation should be executed as if it were
indivisible. See also id. at § 790, where it is stated that "[i]ndivisibility can result indirectly
from a particular circumstance," such as when "the intention of the contracting parties
was that the debt should not be partially discharged."
63. It is very likely that the parties did not contemplate performance at all. Loans
of this nature are almost always for some commercial enterprise in which the parties
think that the obligation will be paid from the profits of the enterprise. The intent of
the parties, therefore, should be determined by what "usage" generally provides for in
such instruments.
64. U.C.C. §§ 3-104 through 112.
19891 1117
8LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
that risk by assuming solidary liability on the note. If one or more of
the parties fails to honor the promise, the other promisors still have
the right of contribution.65 In this way, the risks for the holder of the
note are reduced, and thus the negotiability of the note is enhanced.
As the economies of the various states have become increasingly
integrated, uniformity with respect to negotiable instrument laws has
become an overriding policy consideration. This policy resulted in the
drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, which sought to create
uniform laws governing negotiable instruments. Accordingly, Louisiana
should unify itself with the rest of the country with regard to this special
area of commercial law by adopting the uniform version of section 3-
118(e) of the Uniform Commercial Code. Until the legislature acts,
Louisiana courts should seek to construe negotiable instruments in light
of the prevailing constructions placed on such instruments by the other
jurisdictions.
Gary Finis Strickland
65. La. Civ. Code art. 1804: "Among solidary obligors, each is liable for his virile
portion."
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